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The two sides of National Socialist’s war effort: ideology, 
strategy and logistics in World War II 
In his book, Pasher looks for the answer to a question that is 
far from being “original”. It is easy to assume that most his-
torians (as well as many students) dealing with the Second 
World War and the Third Reich asked themselves how 
much the realization of National Socialist’s extermination 
plans affected the war conduct and how realistic was to as-
sume that those plans critically undermined the German war 
plans. Pasher’s work fits in the line of research attempting to 
consider the Holocaust within the German war plans and 
efforts.  
This perspective was already mentioned by Gerhard Wein-
berg in his A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge, 1994), as well 
as in other works dealing with the Wehrmacht and the military operations and occupation 
strategies of the National-Socialists in Eastern Europe. From this point of view, the author 
provides an interesting perspective with a powerful support of sources, with some excep-
tions in the third and fourth parts, and providing intriguing and yet challenging hypothesis.  
The book is divided in four parts, with the first two further divided into four chap-
ters and the last two in three. Three quarters of the book focus, as one may imagine, on the 
Eastern front, while the final part deals with the entanglement between the extermination 
of the Jews in Eastern Europe and the failed resistance against the Allied invasion of 
France. The author did not make his life easy. He develops a detailed analysis of the war 
logistics, highlighting the moment in which the transport by train became crucial to the 
German war conduct instead of road transport. Then, he moves on in estimating (as com-
plete and clear statistics are difficult to find) the number of trains normally needed to 
transport a certain amount people to the concentration camps, or equipped soldiers to the 
front or tanks and other military supplies. This quantitative approach may seem a bit too 
“arid” as war events are not merely a question of numbers. However, it helps the reader 
getting the correct attitude to follow Pasher’s line of thought.  
Given the limited number and capacity of Eastern European and Soviet railroads 
and the necessity of adaptation works to allow German trains to use them, the author ana-
lyzes how logistics and priority in the use of infrastructures affected the war in the East. For 
a good first part of the book, the reasoning of the author may seem simple mathematics: 
given a certain capacity of the railroad in specific moments he is estimating how many 
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troops and equipment could not be shipped to the front because the infrastructure was be-
ing used to deport prisoners to the concentration camps. However, Pasher goes deeper and 
analyzes the war strategy and the logistics at the front, and proves to be able to entangle 
the war events with the deportation and extermination process.  
The narrative flows almost parallel with the German invasion of Russia progressing 
on one side and the ethnic cleansing of the SS being executed on the other. Particularly, the 
book examines how in crucial moments of the war the decision-making process was influ-
enced by the ideological goals and potentially affected the result of a battle. It is particularly 
interesting, furthermore, to see where the Army and the SS appeared to have clear conflicts 
of interest.  
In the second part, Pasher suggests that the slowing down of the German invasion, 
until the catastrophic defeat at Stalingrad, could have been avoided assuming all the neces-
sary resources could be shipped to the front. Specifically, he tried to entangle the precise 
moments in which the use of resources for the deportation of people to the concentration 
camps prevented the supply of the troops at the front. While this reasoning provides a con-
vincing argument that the Holocaust severely burdened the logistical capabilities of the 
Wehrmacht in certain crucial moments, it does not seem enough to prove that one addi-
tional division or some additional tanks could have changed the military outcome of a bat-
tle.  
However, Pasher did not merely “count the trains” but develops an exhaustive rea-
soning on the war at the East with a critical analysis on previous research considering the 
weather conditions, the inadequacy of German equipment and other factors as the reasons 
behind the German defeat. At the end of the day, Pasher’s hypothesis looks convincing but 
not flawless. In some passages, one may have the impression that the factors other than the 
Holocaust-related issues have been underestimated to add weight to the main thesis. While 
the productivity of the German industries is depicted as much quicker than the ability of 
the Army to deploy tanks and troops, the abilty of the Soviets to retrieve troops from the 
Far East of the country – and the amount of these troops - to reinforce the front, for in-
stance, is never mentioned.  
The third part throws a bridge between the Eastern front and the war against the 
Allied. Once again, the debacle at Kursk, as Stalingrad, is analyzed keeping into account 
that additional forces could have been deployed by the Wehrmacht if the extermination of 
the European Jews had been at least paused for a while. By describing the insurrection in 
the Warsaw Ghetto and the amount of forces and resources deployed to repress it, Pasher 
gives another important clue on how ideological motivations of the National Socialist often 
led to poor judgement in the war conduct in general. However, here one have, once again, 
the impression that the capability of the SS deployed in Warsaw to make the difference at 
the front may have been a bit overestimated.  
Where the narrative of Pasher starts to feel too stretched is at the end of the third 
and for the whole fourth part. Concerning the invasion of Sicily, for example, his account 
seems to rely too much on memories, including disputed ones as that of Otto Skorzeny.  
Furthermore, the relation that the author suggests, that the liquidation of the Hungarian 
Jews came in the way of an effective defense against the Allied landing in the north of 
France, seems a bit stretched. It is undeniable that the operations in Hungary distracted 
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resources and infrastructure that could be used to redeploy troops from the Eastern front. 
However, if in the Russian scenario the direct conflict in the use of infrastructures between 
the Wehrmacht and the SS was straightforward and it is not hard to understand how it 
had a major influence on the military operations, for the Western front one shall not over-
see that other factors played a dominant role. In fact, Pasher does not refrain to account for 
those other factors, such as the lack of railroads in northern France and the constant threat 
of Allied bombings, but still it seems to overestimate the events in the East.  
It may be true that the Germans were able to quickly replace bombed trains and 
repair bridges and railroads, but the overall effect of Allied bombings and the increasing 
lack of resources at the end of the war played probably a most significant role. That said, 
that in such a complex situation the activities related with the Holocaust and the concen-
tration camps still distracted a considerable amount of resources is certainly worth pointing 
out.  
The feeling that somewhere in the book the author may have stretched his thesis 
too much, however, does not change the fact that the conclusion, that the Holocaust and 
the all process of deportation and extermination of the European Jews (and other social 
and ethnic groups) severely damaged the German war operations, is something to agree 
with. Is the same Pasher to put aside the hypothesis that the war could turn out complete-
ly different without the Holocaust that was, in fact, strictly related with the goals of the 
conflict in the world-view of National Socialism. What Pasher shows in a convincing way is 
that ideological elements often severely affected the judgement of the final decision-maker, 
Adolf Hitler, and strongly influenced the prioritization in the use and allocation of resources 
during the conflict.  
Altogether, Pasher’s book is, above all, an essay on logistics and decision making in 
the Third Reich, as well as a very well written analysis of the conflicts between the military 
and ideological goals of the National Socialist regime. It manages to successfully integrate 
the history of the Holocaust in the military history of World War II and it is successful, 
more than previous attempts, in estimating the importance of ideology in the peculiarity of 
the conflict, especially at the Eastern front. As stated at the beginning, many historians 
may have found themselves asking how much the ideology of National Socialism affected 
the German war efforts. Pasher took the chance to “do the math” and the result, despite 
some critical moments, is a well-documented, insightful and well-written book.  
